Security Controls & Protection

Cloud Identity and Access Management

in the cloud, identity is the new perimeter

2 min readupdated by Syed Khaleel Ahmed

In the cloud almost everything is controlled through APIs and consoles, and identities decide who may call them. Control the identities and you control the environment, which is why attackers hunt for cloud credentials.[1]

The main identity types

  • Human users (staff, admins), best managed through your central identity provider with SSO and MFA.
  • Roles: a set of permissions that a user, service or workload can assume temporarily. Temporary credentials expire automatically, which is much safer than permanent keys.
  • Service identities / workload identities: non-human identities for applications and automation.
  • The root or owner account: the all-powerful original account. Protect it with MFA, keep it for rare tasks only and never use it day to day.

Best practices that apply everywhere

  1. Least privilege. Start with minimal permissions and add what is needed. Broad wildcard permissions ("allow all actions on all resources") should be rare and justified.
  2. Prefer roles and short-lived credentials over long-lived access keys. Keys that sit in code, scripts and laptops leak.
  3. MFA for all human users, phishing-resistant for administrators.
  4. Use SSO and federation so joiners and leavers are managed in one place.
  5. Separate accounts or subscriptions for production, development and security tooling to limit blast radius.
  6. Guardrails at the organization level: policies that prevent risky actions regardless of what an individual account admin does.
  7. Review access regularly, and use provider tools that show unused permissions.
  8. Log everything: turn on audit logging for all identity and API activity and watch for unusual events such as new access keys or permission changes.[2]

Common failure patterns

  • Access keys committed to public code repositories.
  • A developer role that can quietly grant itself more permissions (privilege escalation).
  • Service accounts with administrator rights "temporarily".
  • Orphaned accounts of people who left.
  • Overly permissive roles trusted by other accounts.

A quick sanity test

Ask of any identity: who owns it, what can it reach, how does it authenticate, when did it last do something, and would we notice if it was misused?

Sources

  1. AWS IAM: Security best practices
  2. Microsoft Learn: Azure identity management best practices

Test yourself

My notes

Private — saved only on this device, never sent anywhere.