Security Operations & Resilience

OT and ICS Security Basics

when a cyberattack can move a valve, not just a mouse

3 min readupdated by Syed Khaleel Ahmed

Operational technology (OT) is the hardware and software that monitors and controls physical equipment: power plants, water treatment, factories, pipelines, building systems and medical devices. Industrial control systems (ICS) are the systems that run industrial processes. A failure is not only a data problem: it can affect safety, the environment and public services.[1]

Meet the components

  • Sensors and actuators: measure and move things in the physical world (temperature, pumps, valves).
  • PLC (programmable logic controller): a rugged computer that reads sensors and drives actuators according to its program.
  • RTU (remote terminal unit): a field device sending data to a central system.
  • HMI (human-machine interface): the screen operators use to see and control the process.
  • SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition): systems that gather data from many sites and let operators supervise and control them.
  • DCS (distributed control system): control for one large site, such as a plant.
  • Historian: a database that stores process data over time.

How OT differs from IT

IT OT
Top priority Confidentiality Safety and availability
Lifespan 3 to 5 years 15 to 30 years or more
Patching Frequent, scheduled Rare and cautious, often needs a plant shutdown
Protocols TCP/IP, web Modbus, DNP3, PROFINET, OPC UA and others, many designed without security
Impact of failure Data loss, downtime Possible injury, damage, environmental harm

Because of this, an approach copied from IT can do harm. Active vulnerability scanning, for example, can crash fragile controllers.

The Purdue model

A common reference model arranges systems in levels: Level 0 (physical process, sensors and actuators), Level 1 (basic control such as PLCs), Level 2 (supervisory control such as HMIs), Level 3 (site operations), and above that the industrial DMZ and the enterprise IT levels. The principle: keep tight, monitored boundaries between levels and between IT and OT.

Why attacks are possible

Legacy equipment, flat networks, weak or no authentication in old protocols, remote vendor access, USB and laptop use, and growing IT/OT convergence. Well-known incidents include Stuxnet (discovered in 2010, targeting industrial centrifuges), attacks on Ukrainian power distribution in 2015 and later, and the Triton malware that targeted a safety system.

Practical defenses

  1. Know your assets. Build an inventory, preferably with passive network monitoring that does not disturb devices.
  2. Segment IT from OT and divide OT into zones, with controlled conduits (the idea behind IEC 62443).
  3. Secure remote access: MFA, jump hosts, monitored sessions and time-limited vendor access.
  4. Patch and mitigate smartly: test first, schedule with operations, and use compensating controls where patching is impossible.
  5. Harden and allowlist: remove unneeded services, change default passwords.
  6. Monitor OT network traffic for unusual commands and new devices.
  7. Back up configurations and logic, and practice manual operation and recovery.
  8. Make safety systems independent and protect them.
  9. Work together: security and operations teams must trust each other.[2]

Sources

  1. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3: Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security
  2. CISA: Industrial Control Systems

Test yourself

My notes

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